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Abstract 
This article analyses the finances for and the finances from corporate bribery in international business 
transactions and how they are organized. Transnational corporate bribery involves non-criminal commercial 
enterprises that operate in licit markets but that use corrupt means to win or maintain business contracts in 
foreign jurisdictions. This article first considers what needs to be financed, how much finance is needed, and 
how the bribes can be generated and distributed. Second, the article considers the different forms of proceeds 
that emerge out of the bribery, how offenders must conceal the derivation of funds from these crimes while 
also retaining control over them, and how they must overcome particular obstacles. Finally, the article 
discusses responses to the proceeds of bribery and related anti-money laundering provisions, before analysing 
actual and potential mechanisms for intervening with the finances for and from transnational corporate 
corruption.  
 
Introduction 
 
Transnational corporate bribery ;aka ͚foƌeigŶ/oǀeƌseas/international ďƌiďeƌǇ͛Ϳ involves commercial 
enterprises (i.e. primarily legitimate corporations) that operate in licit transnational markets and use 
illicit (financial) transactions/exchanges to win or maintain business contracts in foreign jurisdictions. 
This form of corruption has since the late 20th Century emerged as a priority concern for international 
and world society (e.g. intergovernmental organisations such as the OECD, UN, and EU as well as non-
governmental anti-corruption organisations such as Transparency International and Global Witness, 
amongst others). Such organisations have been ͚ gƌappliŶg͛ oǀeƌ the ĐƌeatioŶ of Ŷoƌŵatiǀe aŶti-bribery 
frameworks to harmonise international standards in combatting bribery in international business 
(Lord, 2015; see also Clark, 2007). The product of this (US-induced1) grappling was primarily the 
OƌgaŶisatioŶ foƌ EĐoŶoŵiĐ CoopeƌatioŶ aŶd DeǀelopŵeŶt͛s ;OECDͿ Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 1997 (hereafter the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention) which is accompanied by a rigorous programme of peer-review monitoring and expert 
evaluations coordinated by intergovernmental organizations (GRECO, 2007; OECD, 2012) and the 
evaluative reports of (inter)national non-governmental organizations (Transparency International, 
2015a) (see Lord, 2014a, for a detailed analyse all related international legal frameworks). This 
international response places nation-states under notable scrutiny making responding to 
transnational corporate bribery a domestic priority. 
 
Transnational corporate bribery is primarily committed for organisational gains (i.e. for the benefit of 
the corporate entity), though may variably benefit the individuals involved on the supply side, either 
diƌeĐtlǇ ;as a ͚ Đut͛Ϳ oƌ iŶdiƌeĐtlǇ, ǀia pƌoŵotioŶ oƌ joď ƌeteŶtioŶ. At the ͚ gƌaŶd͛ leǀel, these gains include 
the awarding or continuance of multi-million Euro contracts for the corporation.  Such bribes take 
myriad forms, from monetary payments (potentially of €billions) and gifts such as luxury watches to 
FIFA delegates through to less direct hospitalities (including attendance at conferences in exotic 
locations, shopping trips, tickets for sports events etc.) and to favours such as the provision of 
prostitutes or current/future employment for self, family oƌ soĐial Ŷetǁoƌk. At the ͚pettǇ͛ leǀel, ďƌiďes 
include small-scale payments, often cash, that facilitate certain business activities (e.g. obtaining 
                                                          
1 When the US introduced the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 it was expected that other nation-states would 
follow suit. This did not immediately occur and so enforcement of the Act did not follow until the creation of the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention created international pressure for other countries to implement analogous 
legislation. 
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building permits or expediting movement through borders) but which in the aggregate can be 
substantial amounts – suĐh ďƌiďes aƌe ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ ƌefeƌƌed to as ͚faĐilitatioŶ paǇŵeŶts͛. TheǇ aƌe 
criminalised in some jurisdictions (e.g. UK) but not in other key exporting jurisdictions such as the US, 
and this creates tensions over how (and indeed whether) to enforce unharmonised laws. In all cases 
of bribery, there is an inherent illicit transaction (a specific event) or relationship (an on-going state) 
between at least two willing or at least consenting active/passive actors that leads to an advantage in 
business for the corporation (see Lord, 2014 for a more detailed analysis). 
 
In this article, we foreground the finances and funds involved in such transnational corporate bribery 
aŶd aƌgue that foĐusiŶg oŶ the ͚ŵoŶeǇ ĐoŵpoŶeŶt͛ ĐaŶ plausiďlǇ offeƌ a situational route to 
intervention. We thus examine the finances central in those behaviours that involve illicit relations of 
exchange between two (often consenting) actors whereby one corporate actor (or group of actors) 
offers, gives, or promises something of perceived value to another requesting, receiving, or soliciting 
͚puďliĐ͛ actor (or group of actors) to induce improper behaviour in the context of international 
business2. There are other dimensions of corruption but we focus here on the ͚gƌaŶd ĐoƌƌuptioŶ͛ 
aspect of transnational corporate bribery as the money trail of such illicit transactions has received 
much campaigning and these are important strategic dimensions, as recognised in G7/20 and 
governmental (e.g. UK Anti-Corruption Strategy) initiatives on understanding who the beneficial 
owners are of corporate vehicles used for illicit finances. Although the European Union has been active 
on ͚beneficial ownership͛ and bank account registers, it is not clear what will be the crime reductive 
benefit if other countries like the British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands do not follow suit.  This 
presents a challenge to the global anti-money laundering process.  There are other areas of 
transnational corporate bribery where transnational control harmonisation is important, but the 
grand corruption dimensions of transnational corporate bribery is certainly one of them unless steps 
are taken to prevent noncompliant jurisdictions from creating risks in other countries. 
 
We focus on the UK as a generator and venue for corruption where since 2002 it has been a criminal 
offence for companies and their employees anywhere in the world to bribe foreign officials (including 
politicians) in the context of international business transactions. This offence was introduced via an 
amendment to the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 that imported a foreign element to 
the ageing Prevention of Corruption Acts (1889 – 1916). This ameŶdŵeŶt ďƌought the UK͛s legal 
framework in line with international legal requirements. In the UK, the introduction of the Bribery Act 
2010 consolidated and strengthened the previously fragmented framework and created the most 
wide-reaching anti-bribery legislation on the globe. This legislation created discrete offences of 
͚ďƌiďiŶg aŶotheƌ peƌsoŶ͛ ;offeƌiŶg, pƌoŵisiŶg oƌ giǀiŶg a fiŶaŶĐial oƌ otheƌ adǀaŶtage), of ͚ ďeiŶg ďƌiďed͛ 
(requesting, agreeing to receive or accepting a financial or other advantage), and of ͚ďƌiďiŶg foreign 
public officials͛ iŶ additioŶ to ŵakiŶg it a criminal offence for a commercial organisation to fail to 
prevent bribery within or by their organisation. The focus in this article is primarily oŶ the ͚supplǇ side͛ 
of bribery, that is, those UK corporations, or employees, subsidiaries and/or agents acting on behalf 
of these corporations, that give, offer or promise a bribe or inducement to a foreign public official 
usually to lead those officials to breach their duties. (Though the article also considers those on the 
͚deŵaŶd/ƌeĐipieŶt side͛Ϳ.  
 
At the time of writing, the most recent UK case to be concluded through criminal prosecution and 
sanctioning foƌ a suďstaŶtiǀe ďƌiďeƌǇ offeŶĐe ;i.e. Ŷot a ͚failuƌe to pƌeǀeŶt ďƌiďeƌǇ͛ Đoƌpoƌate offeŶĐeͿ 
involved printing company Smith and Ouzman Ltd., its directors, an employee and an agent, who made 
a series of payments totalling £395,074 from 2006 to 2010 to public officials in Kenya and Mauritania 
                                                          
2  We ǁould aƌgue that those otheƌ ďehaǀiouƌs ďeǇoŶd ďƌiďeƌǇ that people Đall ͚Đoƌƌupt͛ aƌe ďetteƌ 
conceptualised in other ways such as professional misconduct (e.g. police cover-ups such as that following the 
deaths at Hillsborough) or theft at work (e.g. embezzling public funds, as arguably in the MPs expenses scandal). 
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in order to induce the awarding of business contracts3. The company specialises in security documents 
such as ballot papers and certificates, and was convicted following the confiscation of email evidence 
that iŶdiĐated the DiƌeĐtoƌs used the Đode ǁoƌd ͚ĐhiĐkeŶ͛ foƌ ďƌiďes iŶ disĐussioŶs ǁith theiƌ KeŶǇaŶ 
agent. However, it is not only small and medium sized enterprises that engage in bribery to win 
business contracts. Large commercial enterprises in the UK are also being implicated in the bribery of 
foreign public officials to obtain business, with the defence and engineering company Rolls Royce 
being the latest4. Rolls Royce allegedly offered bribes to the state oil producer, Petrobras, in Brazil, to 
secure a $100m contract to pƌoǀide ŵodules of eŶeƌgǇ geŶeƌatioŶ foƌ the oil ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s platfoƌŵs. 
(Though an alternative possibility is that these bribes were extorted, or given under the assumption 
that the contract would not be awarded on its merits). The UK͛s “eƌious Fƌaud OffiĐe ;“FOͿ opeŶed a 
criminal investigation in December 2013, which is on-going, as are many of these long-lived cases5.  
 
The ďasiĐ ͚oƌgaŶisatioŶ͛ of the finances of such bribery transactions/relations is generally understood. 
It involves the generation/diversion of internal corporate funds via variably complex means to fund 
bribes and inducements (e.g. slush funds hidden within obscure accounts to make cash pay-offs, or 
the iŶĐlusioŶ of ͚kiĐkďaĐk͛ sĐheŵes as paƌt of ĐoŶtƌaĐtsͿ.  However these processes, relations and 
money flows have not been empirically evidenced or analysed. Furthermore, the finances that are 
generated out of bribery, that is, after the bribes have been paid, can take many direct and indirect 
forms but have not been sufficiently conceptualised. The primary objective of this article is to consider 
these issues around the organisation of the finances for, and finances from, transnational corporate 
bribery, and it specifically analyses: (1) what needs to be financed, how much finance is needed, and 
how the bribes can be generated and distributed; and, (2) the different forms of proceeds that 
emerge, how offenders can and must conceal the derivation of funds from these crimes while also 
retaining control over them, and how they must overcome particular obstacles and problems posed 
by controls (such as anti-money laundering). We do not present fresh direct research evidence but 
aim to provide hypotheses as to the financial underpinnings of transnational corporate bribery and 
present useful analytical models to account for necessary and contingent conditions for the bribery 
commission process. We draw upon earlier empirical research and expertise into transnational 
corporate bribery and economic/financial crimes more generally to present an analytical and 
conceptual framework for investigating the organization and intervention of such corruption. The 
article also discusses the current enforcement framework for the proceeds of bribery and related anti-
money laundering provisions, alongside actual and potential mechanisms for intervening before and 
after corrupt payments, in an effort to enhance situational prevention and the reduction of future 
bribery. 
 
Understanding ͚oƌgaŶisatioŶ͛ aŶd how finances aƌe ͚oƌgaŶised͛ 
 
Unlike the illicit markets that are the normal focus of money laundering studies, transnational 
corporate bribery always occurs within legitimate markets and is committed by otherwise legitimate 
businesses (Lord, 2014). That is, it is legitimate occupational positions (e.g. as sales representatives – 
from director-level to mid-level within a procurement department of a trans-national business), 
organisational settings (e.g. legitimate engineering, resource extraction or defence companies 
operating in international markets) and business practices/processes (e.g. buying and selling products 
or services) that create criminal opportunities (e.g. when suitable targets become readily available 
and there is a lack of Đapaďle guaƌdiaŶshipͿ aŶd pƌoǀide ͚ƌeadǇ-ŵade͛ ŵaƌkets, structures and social 
networks (pre-existing or ephemeral) through which to conceal illicit behaviours such as bribery.  
                                                          
3 https://www.sfo.gov.uk/cases/smith-ouzman-ltd/ 
4 http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/aug/30/rolls-royce-cooperate-brazil-investigation-petrobras-
bribery 
5 https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2013/12/23/statement-rolls-royce-2/ 
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Opportunity does not mean that actual bribery will happen; even if contractors are willing to take the 
funds, some or all potential bribers might not see the opportunities to bribe or may evaluate the risks 
and potential consequences of doing so as too high. They may also have ethical/corporate 
reputational objections to bribery or may be making enough money legitimately to turn down the 
opportunities. (Hoǁ ͚ƌatioŶal͛ ĐhoiĐes are made under certain conditions to make illicit payments 
depends on the cognitive frames of those potential bribers). However, the combination of apparent 
virtue and actual vice has long been recognised as a context within which deviant/criminal behaviour 
can occur (see Ross, 1907; Bonger, 1916; Sutherland, 1983) and it is critical to understand how (and 
why) soŵe legitiŵate ;appeaƌiŶgͿ aĐtoƌs ͚ŵake the ŵost of͛ soŵe oppoƌtuŶities that aƌise soŵe of 
the time under particular conditions as part of their legitimate business activities, and how the 
associated subsequent behaviours are organised and financed. However, it should also be noted that 
some contract-awarders at high or middle levels may be extorters of bribes rather than passive 
recipients – iŵpliĐit iŶ ŵuĐh of the deǀelopŵeŶt liteƌatuƌe is the deǀelopiŶg ǁoƌld as ͚ǀiĐtiŵ͛ ƌatheƌ 
thaŶ as ͚eǆtoƌtioŶist͛. 
 
In approaching such an understanding of how the finances for and from bribery are organised, and 
how opportunities for criminal behaviour organically emerge or are actively manufactured, we need 
to recognise the interplay between the following levels of analysis: social-structural (e.g. 
economic/social/market forces); institutional (e.g. organisational cultures, pressures and conditions); 
and individual (e.g. the symbolic interactions of employees within their social networks and their 
cognition of particular signs). However, given the difficulties in accessing corporate subsystems for 
empirical research, it is hard to analyse the natural environments and settings of offending behaviour 
and therefore to understand aŶd test ͚adeƋuatelǇ͛ the motivations of offenders. A more pragmatic 
approach is to consider the particular crime events (rather than the criminality of a particular context 
or person) and how they are shaped by these various levels of analysis. Thus, the focus on finances 
makes no theoretical assumptions about the nature of the offender, whether rational economic actors 
or otherwise, or the risks that may or may not be inherent in different activities. The focus on finances 
is ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith hoǁ suĐh iŶǀolǀed fiŶaŶĐes aƌe ͚oƌgaŶised͛ ;i.e. ǁhat is needed and why). 
 
Criminological theory provides a useful lens through which to analyse these multiple levels. More 
specifically, in order to analyse how criminal actions are accomplished and opportunities realised, Levi 
(2008) provides a useful process model developed in relation to the organisation of fraud. This model 
draws upon earlier work from Levi and Maguire (2004: 457) where it was argued that it is important 
to deǀelop ͚a Đaƌeful aŶd ĐoŵpƌeheŶsiǀe aŶalǇsis of the Ŷatuƌe of the pƌoďleŵ to ďe addƌessed, 
iŶĐludiŶg deǀelopiŶg a Đleaƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of the ǀaƌious Đƌiŵe sĐeŶes, aĐtoƌs aŶd theiƌ ƌesouƌĐes͛. 
͚Cƌiŵe sĐƌipt aŶalǇsis͛ opeƌatioŶalizes this, illuŵiŶatiŶg the dǇŶaŵiĐs aŶd oƌgaŶisatioŶ of suĐh 
activities within conducive settings, by enabling aŶ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of the ͚sĐƌipts͛ ǁhiĐh ĐƌiŵiŶals go 
through (i.e. the sequence of actions used by offenders) in the crime-commission process – this entails 
aŶ aŶalǇsis of the ͚ƌoutiŶe aĐtiǀities͛ of the Đƌiŵe ĐoŵŵissioŶ pƌoĐess (e.g. how do motivated 
offenders, targets and a lack of capable guardianship converge in time and space) and the patterns of 
behaviour that may indicate likely areas of criminal behaviour (see for example Zanella, 2013, in 
relation to corruption in public procurement specifically; and Clarke, 1997, Benson et al., 2009, Benson 
and Simpson, 2015, for application to comparable white-collar and occupational crimes).  
 
This is important, as corporate bribery is ͚paƌasitiĐal͛ oŶ legitiŵate ďusiŶess pƌaĐtiĐes ǁheƌe ďƌiďes 
can be conveniently ĐoŶĐealed ďehiŶd the dailǇ, ƌoutiŶe ďehaǀiouƌs of the offeŶdeƌs͛ legitiŵate 
occupations – this makes both detection and proof to a criminal standard of certainty difficult for 
regulators and compliance actors, and for criminal courts. In other words, criminals become aware of 
oppoƌtuŶities as theǇ eŶgage iŶ theiƌ Ŷoƌŵal legitiŵate aĐtiǀities, fiŶdiŶg ͚taƌgets͛ iŶ faŵiliaƌ plaĐes 
with opportunities most likely to be taken advantage of when they are closer to areas of familiarity 
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(see Brantingham and Brantingham, 1991 – although applied heƌe to ͚ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶal Đƌiŵe͛, the logiĐ is 
also applicable to corporate crimes). In this sense and in the nomenclature of crime pattern theory, 
bribery is most likely to take place at the edges (e.g. the less regulated and less transparent areas of 
business activities where key actors interact - such as the use of Intermediaries/agents to provide 
access to external sources) of commonly trodden paths (e.g. the procedures and networks that 
establish communication or business relations with others) between key nodes (e.g. the cooperating 
or interacting actors in the bribery transaction such as a corporation and a foreign public official or set 
of officials responsible for awarding particular contraĐtsͿ iŶ the offeŶdeƌs͛ Ŷetǁork (see Benson et al., 
2009). Understanding how opportunities emerge in this way has implications for how the finances for 
and from bribery must be organised and we must therefore understand the organisation of the 
finances of bribery in terms of ͚how would-be offenders confront problems of gaining finance, gaining 
aĐĐess to Đƌiŵe oppoƌtuŶities, aŶd ƌetaiŶiŶg theiƌ fƌeedoŵ aŶd Đƌiŵe pƌoĐeeds͛ ;Levi, 2009: 225). 
 
Necessity and contingency in the bribery commission process 
 
As figure 1 indicates, we can think of a bribery transaction or relation as a process that requires inputs 
(e.g. the creation of funds that can be used to finance the supply-side of the bribery, whether this is a 
cash payment or some other tangible inducement) and which generates outputs (e.g. a particular 
business contract or other tangible advantage) and outcomes (e.g. the continuance of business in a 
particular sector or market). This is a process that requires analysis of: 
 
i. the necessary elements and mechanics of the bribery commission process. Here we must 
ask questions such as:  
a. Scripts: what is the sequence of events or actions that offenders must go through in 
order to be able to carry out bribery? What aƌe the ͚sĐƌipts͛ that theǇ ŵust aĐt out 
before, during and after the transaction? Including, if it reaches that stage, accounts 
given to private sector auditors, the media, and criminal/regulatory investigators.  
(The stage at which such events are anticipated by those who contemplate offending 
is itself an interesting empirical issue, which falls outside the scope of this article.) 
b. Activities: Are there particular routines or patterns in their occupational roles that are 
more susceptible to facilitating or concealing bribery? 
c. Opportunities/processes: which business practices and processes are most conducive 
to providing opportunities to bribe, how are they structured and how do they emerge 
or how are they manufactured? 
d. Skill sets, knowledge and expertise: for offenders to recognise bribery opportunities 
and realise them, certain cognitive and behavioural capacities are required, but what 
are these? 
 
ii. the contingent conditions that shape the nature of the finances for and from the bribery 
transactions and here we must ask questions such as: 
a. Enablers/facilitators: which actors or tools (un/wittingly) facilitate the bribery beyond 
those directly involved in the transaction and how are such actors/tools identified as 
co-operators and collaborators by direct offenders? 
b. Money laundering/concealment: how do cooperating offenders conceal the flows of 
monies for or from illicit transactions such as reinvesting profits for future bribes or 
incorporating profits in the corporate finances? 
c. Situations and contexts: how do social-structural, institutional and immediate 
contexts shape individual behaviours and provide for conducive conditions for 
offending? 
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FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
The area of necessity reflects those processes, activities and interactions that must occur for the 
bribery to take place; but such criminal activities can only be carried out should opportunities arise 
under conducive conditions. For example, drawing upon routine activities perspective, we can see 
that three elements must combine: a specific situation (e.g. a vulnerability in the procurement chain 
converging at a time and location), a target (e.g. the perceived simplicity of bribery through 
hospitalities), and the absence of capable guardians (e.g. inadequate anti-corruption regulation and 
oversight) – to create the opportunity for successful offending. However, necessity is constituted of 
more than the convergence in time and space of these three elements. Also necessary is a subjective 
interpretation by an offender that a bribery opportunity is available; the actualisation of this 
interpretation is dependent on the offender possessing the specific skills, knowledge and expertise to 
realise aŶ oppoƌtuŶitǇ. That is, ďeiŶg ͚ŵotiǀated͛ iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of aŶ oppoƌtuŶitǇ aŶd laĐk of 
guardianship is not enough. In this sense, we can begin to organise our thinking to consider bribery in 
teƌŵs of the ͚ skill sets, ĐoŶtaĐts, staƌt-up Đapital, aŶd ƌuŶŶiŶg Đosts that theǇ ƌeƋuiƌe͛ ;Levi, 2009: 231). 
  
The area of contingency reflects an appreciation of the interplay between individual, 
organisational/institutional and wider structural influences on the creation of bribery opportunities 
and propensities to offend (e.g. corporate cultures of implied consent to illicit behaviour, and complex 
decision-making structures that facilitate unethical decisions as shaped by demands for economic 
success – which may or may not be modified by ethical training, especially in the aftermath of scandal) 
and the creation and maintenance of networks (e.g. how do middle-managers in business identify 
prospective corrupt partners or recruit those with money laundering expertise). In addition, staff 
working for the firms must also identify the situation as an opportunity for bribery and must be able 
to conceive of how to do it, including what words to use to enable their targets to participate as 
collaborators. We do not claim to have identified a complete or comprehensive set of contingent 
influences but the following are likely to significantly shape the organisation of the bribery and more 
specifically the finances that are needed and that are generated: 
 
 
1. Purpose and form of bribery:  
a. Grand or petty bribery? Are the bribes monetary (e.g. cash, kickbacks) or non-
monetary, even invisible to outsiders (e.g. gifts, services, favours to be repaid at some 
future date)? Is the intent to obtain a contract or facilitate business? (Bribery may 
relate to a discrete, distinct outcome such as obtaining a particular business contract 
but the outcomes of bribery may also be less obvious, such as when small payments 
at borders expedite normal business activities) 
 
 
2. Nature of criminal/social network: 
a. Which level of employees are involved ;e.g. ͚oƌdiŶaƌǇ eŵploǇees͛, ͚ŵiddle-ŵaŶageƌs͛ 
aŶd/oƌ ͚ďoaƌd/eǆeĐutiǀes͛)? Does the bribery involve individual actors,  small groups 
within and/or outside of the corporation, or more extensive networks? 
 
 
3. Nature of organisation: 
a. How simple or complex on a scale are the human and/or financial structures used? 
Does it involve the use of corporate vehicles/offshore accounts, intermediaries and 
agents, and so on? 
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4. Level of pervasiveness: 
a. Is the bribery pervasive within the corporation? Does it involved isolated, discrete 
incidents or systemic/on-going states and conditions? 
 
 
5. Level of intent: 
a. Is the bribery pre-planned well in advance or is it more organic and responsive (i.e. 
are the bribes, favours and/or demands oŶ a ͚slippeƌǇ slope͛)? 
 
 
6. Size of business: 
a. Does the bribery occur within small and medium enterprises or within larger 
corporations)? 
 
 
These factors all shape the finances that are needed or generated and how the bribery transactions 
and relations are organised. It is not possible here to provide a comprehensive set of all possible 
realities within this very broad set of conditions. However, with these factors in mind, the following 
sections analyse the organisation of the finances for and from transnational corporate bribery and 
throughout consider the interplay between the necessary components of the crime commission 
process and the contingent conditions that create conducive settings for offending behaviour. 
 
 
The Finances For Transnational Corporate Bribery 
 
This section considers three main questions, namely: 
 
A. What needs to be financed?  
B. How much finance is needed? 
C. How are the processes inherent within this organised to generate and distribute these 
finances in order for corporate bribery to take place? 
 
Bribery, as ǁith all huŵaŶ ďehaǀiouƌs, is ͚situated aĐtioŶ͛ that ŵust ďe understood within particular 
contexts and organisational cultures (i.e. the process of crime commission cannot be detached from 
its cultural context, though we may seek to identify common referents in comparable cases across 
contexts). Key components, processes and features of corporate bribery, as with many white-collar 
crimes, include: i. the offenders have legitimate access to the location(s) where the bribery takes place 
as well as to corporate resources\finances as part of their daily activities and employment – this is a 
necessity since, without a legitimate occupational position, the bribery cannot occur. However, the 
place where the bribery is agreed may not be that where the financial interchange(s) takes place, and 
in principle the latter may involve multiple jurisdictions; ii. the offenders are spatially separated from 
the ultimate victims, meaning that as they operate in their corporate subsystems they are able, if 
ŶeĐessaƌǇ, to ͚Ŷeutƌalise͛ aŶd/oƌ ͚ƌatioŶalise͛ ĐoŶĐeƌŶs oǀeƌ aŶǇ poteŶtial ǀiĐtiŵs, such as the 
unknowing public in those countries where funds are diverted to private hands or where inferior 
products end up; and, iii. the actions of the offenders have a superficial appearance of legitimacy, as 
a bribe can be easily concealed as an otherwise legitimate financial transaction which can circumvent 
routine detection mechanisms (see Benson and Simpson, 2015: 101). These features are central 
because bribes, like some other forms corporate and white-collar frauds, would be unsuccessful if 
they did not look sufficiently like legitimate activity not to stand out as ͚out of plaĐe͛ to even slightly 
capable and motivated guardians1, and this gives some business offenders a structural advantage over 
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other types of offenders (Levi, 2015: 11). 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Since the introduction of the foreign bribery offence in the UK in 2002, there have been 12 cases 
sanctioned until February 2016. At the level of necessity, the illicit transaction or relation inherent in 
corporate bribery must involve at least two actors, one who gives the bribe and one who receives the 
bribe. That said, of all the cases in the UK illustrated in table 1, none involved only one individual acting 
on behalf of the organisation. More likely, offenders will cooperate and collaborate through their 
social networks that may exist internally and/or externally to the corporation. These may be 
ephemeral and established when necessary or pre-existing and well-maintained, but in both cases the 
network is likely to be horizontally organised and flexible, rather than with a vertical structure and 
monolithic. In this sense, ͚ǁe Ŷeed to oƌgaŶize ouƌ ŵiŶds to uŶdeƌstaŶd hoǁ offeŶdeƌs Đoopeƌate͛ 
(Felson, 2006: 8). The nature of these cooperating networks shapes how finances are generated. 
Unless the bribery is organised and pervasive across the whole corporation, offenders must hide their 
illicit activities and the illicit finances from co-workers not involved in the bribery transactions. For 
example, legal enterprises are required to keep detailed records of their finances and transactions and 
so offenders must conceal (with co-offenders) their behaviour from possibly internal but certainly 
external actors – it is more straightforward to conceal illicit transactions in larger corporations and 
less so in smaller and medium sized enterprises, and it is in these latter cases where there may be 
more direct involvement by directors and boards. (Or at least evidentially, such 
awareness/involvement by the directing minds of the company is more easily demonstrated by law 
enforcement authorities in the courts). Hoǁeǀeƌ, iŶ Đoƌpoƌate ďƌiďeƌǇ, ͚ŵost ďƌiďes aƌe paid ďǇ 
eŵploǇees aŶd ageŶts, Ŷot top ŵaŶageŵeŶt͛ ;‘ose-Ackerman, 1999: 57)6. 
 
Such deception, abuse of trust and concealment/conspiracy have been identified as common 
techniques for white-collar offenders more generally (Benson and Simpson, 2015). Some actors may 
become aware of the illegal activities of their colleagues but empirical evidence from analogous 
͚ǁhite-Đollaƌ͛ Đƌiŵes iŶdiĐates that ͚ǁalls of seĐƌeĐǇ aŶd sileŶĐe͛ ĐaŶ eŵeƌge ǁheƌe the cognitive 
dissonance, concerted ignorance, inaction in the face of knowing or the fear of the consequences of 
disclosure of colleagues can create conditions facilitative of the crimes, such as bribery, particular 
when the offenders are respected or central figures in the business (see van de Bunt, 2010). Those 
who do make disclosures, and/or compliance departments raising concern over such behaviours, may 
also be neutralised by corporate interests and threats. (There are analogies here with accounting 
frauds such as Olympus and Toshiba in Japan, or Enron and Lehman Brothers in the US). 
 
Thus, when analysing the finances for bribery, legitimate corporations, or the employees acting on 
their behalf (e.g. ordinary employees, middle-managers, agents etc) that enter into bribery 
arrangements must calculate the funds required for bribes, whether a one-off transaction or as part 
of an on-going set of transactions, when opportunities arise through their business practices; and must 
conceal these illicit practices from colleagues and/or from routine detection mechanisms. Decisions 
to ďƌiďe aƌe likelǇ to ďe ͚ƌatioŶal͛ ;ďut bounded i.e. limited by normative awareness, ignorance, 
imperfect information or organizational cultures) calculations, as organisational economic interests 
guide the decision-making process of employees although organisational cultures may promote 
redefined parameters of acceptable behaviours (e.g. if neutralised in the light of competitor 
behaviour) or offenders may not be aware of legal requirements even when operating in high-risk 
jurisdictions. (This latter scenario undermines models of rational choice theories, even when it 
ĐoŶtaiŶs aŶ eleŵeŶt of ǁilful ďliŶdŶess ͚if Ǉou doŶ͛t ask, Ǉou ǁoŶ͛t fiŶd out ǁhat is Ŷot alloǁed͛). 
Furthermore, in terms of the level of pervasiveness, corporate bribery rarely involves an isolated, 
                                                          
6 Top management might be more likely to be involved in cartels where they can deal out which bid will 
succeed on principles of reciprocity between repeat players. 
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discrete incident but rather a series of discrete incidents or is more systemic, reflecting an on-going 
state or condition, or series of illicit transactions: this determines how the finances will need to be 
generated. 
 
In terms of the actual monies involved, it is clear that the finances needed for bribery are substantial. 
The overall sums of specific bribery arrangements (in the aggregate) in these cases range from 
£200,000 to £7.7m. While these figures in themselves are substantial, they can also be misleading as 
there are also known cases that have not resulted in sanctions where the alleged bribes totalled 
significantly more (e.g. see the dropped BAE Systems case where bribes of over £6bn were alleged 
(see Lord, 2014)). For purposes of comparison, other international cases have also involved substantial 
amounts: the Siemens scandal2 prosecuted 2008 in Germany (and the US) involved bribes totalling 
appƌoǆiŵatelǇ €ϭ.ϯďŶ ǁhile the Elf AƋuitaiŶe sĐaŶdal3 prosecuted in France in 2003 involved the 
ŵisappƌopƌiatioŶ of oǀeƌ €ϯϱϬŵ fƌoŵ the ĐoŵpaŶǇ ďǇ seŶioƌ eǆeĐutiǀes, ŵuĐh of ǁhiĐh ǁas used to 
bribe political decision makers. (Note that these bribes are a variable but sometimes modest sub-set 
of the harm done to the victims.) 
 
Of course, these data relate to ͚kŶoǁŶ Đases͛ aŶd this has oďǀious pƌoďleŵs. Foƌ iŶstaŶĐe, those 
corporates more elusive of routine detection may utilise different modus operandi while case 
information is not always transparent or publically available, so understanding of the specifics is 
limited. “iŵilaƌlǇ, ŵaŶǇ Đases that aƌe ͚kŶoǁŶ͛ ŵaǇ Ŷot haǀe ďeeŶ saŶĐtioŶed. Thus, it ĐaŶŶot ďe said 
how (un)representative these cases are of all cases of transnational corporate bribery, but we might 
reasonably assume that key features are likely to be evident across all cases.  For example, an analysis 
of sanctioned cases in the UK indicates the following commonalities in terms of ͚fiŶaŶĐial͛ 
organisation:  
 
1. Inaccurate accounting records arising in relation to certain payment irregularities (e.g. 
Breach of s.221 Companies Act 1985) – abuse of trust and concealment. 
2. Improper payments/inducements made via ͚ŵiddle-ŵeŶ͛ oƌ agents in corresponding 
countries. These payments cover costs/commissions of the agent/intermediary plus 
subsequent bribes, often determined as a percentage of the contract gained or product 
sales – conspiracy. 
3. Monies transferred via corporate vehicles and complex financial structures such as offshore 
accounts – deception and concealment. 
 
However, the purposes of a corporate bribe can vary and the form of bribes have been variously 
conceptualized and categorized, and this has implications for the type of finances required and how 
they are generated. For example, distinctions have been made ďetǁeeŶ ďƌiďes that aƌe ͚aĐĐoƌding to 
ƌule͛ aŶd ďƌiďes that aƌe ͚agaiŶst the ƌule͛ (see Oldenburg, 1987). The distinction here refers to 
whether the underlying purpose of the bribe is to ensure the commission and/or omission of an act 
that a public official would otherwise undertake as part of their routine, daily activities, or not. 
͚AĐĐoƌdiŶg to ƌule͛ ŵaǇ iŶǀolǀe a ďoƌdeƌ offiĐial eǆpeditiŶg the ŵoǀeŵeŶt of loƌƌies thƌough 
ĐheĐkpoiŶts oŶ ƌeĐeipt of a ͚paǇ-off͛ ;i.e. alloǁiŶg legitiŵate loƌƌies thƌough ďoƌdeƌs is paƌt of the 
offiĐial͛s occupational role), or the accelerating of an application process for the granting of a permit 
or license – as Rose-AĐkeƌŵaŶ ;ϭϵϵϵ: ϭϱͿ Ŷotes, ͚[s]iŶĐe tiŵe is ŵoŶeǇ, fiƌŵs aŶd iŶdiǀiduals ǁill paǇ 
to avoid delay. In many countries a telephone, a passport, oƌ a dƌiǀeƌ͛s liĐeŶĐe ĐaŶŶot ďe oďtaiŶed 
eǆpeditiouslǇ ǁithout a paǇoff͛.  “uĐh ďƌiďes aƌe ofteŶ ĐhaƌaĐteƌised as ͚pettǇ͛, iŶǀolǀe sŵall ǀalue aŶd 
usually take the form of cash transactions and are often normalised as part of common, cultural 
practice in those jurisdictions where they most frequently occur.  The US does not criminalise such 
͚faĐilitatioŶ paǇŵeŶts͛ bribery under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. IŶ ĐoŶtƌast, ͚agaiŶst the ƌule͛ 
requires the public official to breach their occupational duties, such as notifying a particular company 
of the details of competitor bids during the tendering process for public procurement contracts, or 
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awarding a contract to a company that is less suited to state/public needs than another in exchange 
for a bribe (i.e. the official is abusing the trust inherent of the occupational role). Such bribes are often 
ĐhaƌaĐteƌised as ͚gƌaŶd͛, iŶǀolǀe high ǀalue tƌaŶsaĐtioŶs that Đan take multiple monetary and non-
monetary forms. 
 
The particular form of the bribes themselves can vary. For example, we can distinguish between those 
that are of a monetary or money-equivalent nature and those that are not. An OECD paper analysed 
known cases of bribery in public procurement and demonstrated that a range of tangible benefits may 
be given including gifts, travel, entertainment, payment of domestic expenses, works in private 
homes, computers, jewels or expensive watches, free shares in companies and sexual services. 
However, ͚money is always of interest because it is rapid, simple and practical. Also, the bribee need 
not wait for the bribe to be valuable as would be the case for stamps given to a stamp collector, for 
iŶstaŶĐe͛ ;OECD, ϮϬϬϳ: ϰϳ).  The main types of monetary bribes include cash bribe/pay-off and 
commissions/fees. As the report indicates, 
 
͚[ŵ]oŶeǇ ŵaǇ ďe giǀeŶ iŶ haŶd; ďut ŵoŶeǇ is ŵost fƌeƋueŶtlǇ tƌaŶsfeƌƌed to the offiĐial͛s aĐĐouŶt oƌ aŶ 
account designated by the official (e.g. a third party beneficiary). The account may be located in a 
foreign bank, perhaps in an offshore centre. Bribers may also give the bribee or a third party free 
disposal of a Đƌedit Đaƌd oŶ a ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s aĐĐouŶt oƌ offeƌ fƌee shaƌes iŶ a ĐoŵpaŶǇ. FiŶallǇ, a case was 
presented where the bribe was organised via a loan that was never reimbursed. The types of 
aƌƌaŶgeŵeŶt iŶ these last tǁo eǆaŵples aƌe ĐoŶsideƌed paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ diffiĐult to deteĐt aŶd iŶǀestigate͛ 
(OECD, 2007: 47).  
 
Thus, cash bribes may be taken from large commission fees paid to the third-party, may be regular 
payments to encourage officials to turn a blind eye to illegal activities (drugs/people/mineral 
smuggling, etc), or may be stand alone, one-off payments for a specific act or omission. The purpose 
of the pay-off may sometimes go beyond the inducing of, or acceleration of, a specific act or omission 
and intend to acquire the official for an extended period of time. (An exclusive focus on individual 
transactions would be a mistake, since bribes can be part of a cumulative process, and it may be hard 
foƌ iŶdiǀiduals ǁho oŶĐe ͚fall͛ to get out of futuƌe tƌaŶsaĐtioŶs siŶĐe theǇ ŵaǇ ďe susĐeptiďle to 
blackmail.) “ǇŶoŶǇŵs of ͚paǇ-offs͛ iŶĐlude kiĐkďaĐks, gƌease-money, baksheesh, etc. Commissions 
usually take the form of a percentage of the money received for a given transaction or as a sum to the 
responsible agent or intermediary. Cash or valuable considerations such as businesses, real estate or 
securities and may involve written contracts that appear to be lawful. 
 
We can distinguish between the direct and indirect costs of bribery. Direct costs include the amount 
required for the bribe itself, whether cash or other monetary value (e.g. shopping trips, hospitalities 
etc). Cash poses particular questions over how offenders are able to conceal from or deceive 
colleagues when withdrawing cash from corporate accounts, or involve them as conspirators, even if 
they are simply following instructions. However, in the current legal environment of anti-money 
laundering, potential theft allegations and the Bribery Act, it is hard to see how accounts staff can 
easily go along with this undeceived, even if they are disincentivised by the fear of dismissal or non-
promotion to ask questions of their senior executives. Nonetheless, in such cases, offshore accounts 
and shell firms can obscure the transfer of monies cross-jurisdictionally in order to protect beneficial 
owners of particular accounts but also enable corporations and offenders to move money 
electronicallǇ, hiddeŶ as aŵďiguous ;aŶd ĐƌeatiǀeͿ aĐĐouŶtiŶg/fiŶaŶĐial tƌaŶsaĐtioŶs ;e.g. ͚seƌǀiĐes͛, 
͚ĐoŵŵissioŶs͛ etc) before cash is withdrawn in less regulated systems and directed to foreign public 
officials. Indirect costs include the company resources required such as the investment of time by 
employees away from wholly legitimate business activities or the use of company equipment and 
technologies. Time and material resources are required for the bribery: planning, commission, post-
crime risk management, concealment of profits and so on all require resourcing. Other indirect costs 
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may be actual regulatory fines and criminal penalties, plus supervision costs:  but these accrue only if 
and when action is taken. (Regulators, prosecutors and judges can also sometimes be bribed.) 
 
It is not possible to estimate the figures involved in all direct and moreover indirect costs. Indirect 
Đosts doŶ͛t ƌeallǇ haǀe to ďe paid speĐifiĐallǇ – and to the extent that the bribes are for the firm and 
get the business, they are balanced against the benefits. However, understanding the wider finances 
involved in bribery is important for when we begin to consider how to reduce bribery from taking 
place (see below). In both cases, bribes that originate with particular corporations must be accounted 
for even if they are distributed via third parties and obscure accounting practices but some records 
must exist given the finances are generated from pre-existing income from legitimate means (at least 
in the primary/initial bribery transaction). Financing crime is inhibited by risks both of losing the 
investment and introducing criminal liability to those who otherwise would not face it (Levi, 2015: 3). 
 
The Finances From Transnational Corporate Bribery 
 
This section aims to answer a further three questions: 
 
D. What are the different forms of proceeds that emerge out of the bribery? 
E. How do offenders conceal the derivation of funds from these crimes while also retaining 
control over them? 
F. How do they overcome particular obstacles and problems posed by controls? 
  
While the finances required for bribery are substantial, it is logical to assume that the finances 
generated out of the bribery are at least equal, but likely even greater, otherwise the illicit transaction 
has no economic rationality. The finances from transnational corporate bribery at the ͚gƌaŶd͛ leǀel 
most frequently include direct and tangible advantages such as the awarding of a business contract or 
the granting of a particular permit for business operations. The value of such tangible outputs can be 
determined through assessing, for instance, the value of the contract obtained or the potential 
business generated through access to a particular market or area although the latter scenario presents 
greater valuation obstacles than the former. In terms of the known cases in the UK, table 1 indicates 
contracts worth up to £100m have been received as a result of bribery and these figures outweigh the 
direct costs of the bribery itself. 
 
While such advantages are direct, in some cases it can be difficult to ascertain their financial value, 
particularly when assessing the value of gains from low-leǀel ͚pettǇ͛ ĐoƌƌuptioŶ oƌ ͚facilitation 
payments͛ but in all cases, some form of monetary advantage is obtained. Facilitation payments in 
reality increase business operating costs, as payments may be unexpected and inconsistent (although 
it is likely risk assessments undertaken by corporations would identify such possibilities). In the 
aggƌegate these ͚ ďƌiďes͛ ĐaŶ ďe ĐostlǇ ďut, in contrast to the financial gain at the high-end, they remain 
ǁoƌthǁhile ͚eǆpeŶses͛ as ĐoŶtƌaĐts iŶ the £ŵillioŶs suďstaŶtially outweigh facilitation payments in the 
£hundreds or £thousands.  
 
Tangible advantages may also be more indirect such as the creation of fees, dividends and revenues 
provided by subsidiaries that were directly involved in the bribery. In the cases of Amec and Oxford 
Publishing, while these companies were not direct perpetrators, their associations through ownership 
structures generated financial gain. Similarly, in the case of Mabey and Johnson, the SFO was able to 
agree a repayment settlement of the benefits received via dividends for the shareholder that 
amounted to £131,201 under Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002: this demonstrated that even 
if unaware of the criminal behaviour, firms can be made subject to civil action4. 
 
Corporate offenders do not always specifically ͚lauŶdeƌ͛ the fiŶaŶĐes geŶeƌated fƌoŵ ďƌiďeƌǇ in the 
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commonly understood sense of the concept (i.e. referring to the need for criminal proceeds to be 
legitimised or integrated into the established financial system). Advantages and profits are 
automatically returned as part of an otherwise legitimate business transaction that could have 
occurred with or without the bribery. If the bribery itself remains hidden, there is no action: rather, 
the difficulty is ensuring that funds handed over to third parties or targets actually are used for the 
goals intended by the briber. If the goals intended are not met, the briber has little opportunity for 
recourse as they can hardly notify formal authorities to seek compensation. The key issue is for 
offenders to keep the bribery concealed and retain control over these monies (see Levi, 2015: 10). 
Little attention has been paid to the risks of being complained about by losing bidders for contracts, 
for example, but there remains also a risk from internal corporate whistleblowers, from auditors and 
from bankers and others making suspicious activity reports which may (or may not) be followed up by 
criminal investigators. Managing such risks may itself incur further costs should colleagues or other 
͚regulators͛ need paying off. 
 
Methods of concealment are shaped by how pervasive and organized the corporate bribery is. We 
might consider offeŶdeƌs͛ positioŶ iŶ hieƌaƌĐhiĐal oƌgaŶisatioŶal Đoƌpoƌate stƌuĐtuƌes suĐh as ǁhetheƌ 
the ďƌiďeƌǇ iŶǀolǀes ͚oƌdiŶaƌǇ eŵploǇees͛, ͚ŵiddle-ŵaŶageƌs͛, aŶd/oƌ seŶioƌ ďoaƌd leǀel eŵploǇees 
and executives. This would shape the available opportunities for concealment and practices and 
cooperation that would be required. For example, if illicit profits were directed via the use of corporate 
vehicles, then this would likely require senior collusion and notable organisational support/ignorance 
and it can be expected that offeŶdeƌs͛ ďehaǀiouƌs iŶ suĐh Đases ǁould ƌeƋuiƌe a ĐeƌtaiŶ leǀel pƌe-
planning to ensure that profits and gains can be concealed. To conceal the profits, some form of 
collusion and/cooperation with external actors such as accountants and lawyers may be required to 
facilitate these processes, though informational shielding and distortion may reduce the risks from 
them. As Levi ;ϮϬϭϱ: ϭϬͿ Ŷotes, ͚this iŶǀolǀes tƌust iŶ a paƌtiĐulaƌ peƌsoŶ oƌ peƌsoŶs — perhaps a 
ŵeŵďeƌ of oŶe͛s Đlose oƌ eǆteŶded faŵilǇ or ethnic/religious group — or trust in an institution, such 
as a bank or a money service business (MSB) or a lawyer who may be a trustee of a corporate entity, 
to aŶ eǆteŶt suffiĐieŶt to defeat ǁhateǀeƌ leǀel of sĐƌutiŶǇ ǁill aĐtuallǇ ďe applied͛.  
 
Trust is central across the process of the illicit transaction, as offenders may abuse the trust given to 
them by employers or shareholders ;uŶless theǇ aƌe ͚ aŵoƌal͛ aŶd haǀe Ŷo ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of suĐh aďusesͿ, 
but must also trust others themselves to ensure the bribery is sufficiently concealed and profits 
usefully diverted and controlled. Rose-AĐkeƌŵaŶ ;ϭϵϵϵ: ϵϴͿ Ŷotes, ͚the aďilitǇ to estaďlish tƌust ďased 
oŶ Đlose peƌsoŶal ƌelatioŶships helps ƌeduĐe the ƌisks of disĐlosuƌe…[aŶd]…pƌoǀides a guaƌaŶtee of 
performance when payment and quid pro quo aƌe sepaƌated iŶ tiŵe͛. 
 
Those at the demand-side of the transaction or relationship may need to conceal the origin of the 
funds if they wish to use them within legitimate financial structures (rather than simply spend the 
money or sink it into less surveilled assets). A recent Financial Action Task Force (2011) report created 
a ͚tǇpologǇ͛ oŶ lauŶdeƌiŶg the pƌoĐeeds of gƌaŶd ĐoƌƌuptioŶ ;ŵoƌe of a ĐategoƌizatioŶ ďased oŶ 
anecdotal evidence, ratheƌ thaŶ aŶ eŵpiƌiĐallǇ/theoƌetiĐallǇ iŶfoƌŵed set of ͚tǇpes͛Ϳ aŶd ideŶtified 
the following central mechanisms that can be used to facilitate this process: The use of (1) corporate 
vehicles and trusts, (2) gatekeepers (i.e. facilitators and enablers), (3) domestic financial institutions, 
;ϰͿ offshoƌe/foƌeigŶ juƌisdiĐtioŶs, ;ϱͿ ŶoŵiŶees, aŶd ;ϲͿ Đash. The ĐoŶĐeƌŶ iŶ the ƌepoƌt is ǁith ͚gƌaŶd 
ĐoƌƌuptioŶ͛, defiŶed ďǇ TI ;ϮϬϭϱbͿ as ĐoŶsistiŶg ͚of acts committed at a high level of government that 
distort policies or the central functioning of the state, enabling leaders to benefit at the expense of 
the puďliĐ good͛, aŶd politiĐallǇ eǆposed peƌsoŶs ;PEPsͿ. There are clear commonalities in the modus 
operandi of control and concealment by both briber and bribee. 
 
While the focus in this article is primarily on the supply-side (i.e. UK companies), the UK system is 
currently being scrutinised in relation to the structures provided in the UK for those at the demand-
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side, as ͚[Đ]oƌƌupt foƌeigŶ offiĐials seek to lauŶdeƌ the proceeds of their corruption and hide stolen 
assets iŶ the UK͛ ;HM GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt, UK AŶti-Corruption Plan, 2014: 19). Particularly issues of concern 
ƌelate to the UK pƌopeƌtǇ ŵaƌket aŶd diffiĐulties iŶ estaďlishiŶg the ͚ďeŶefiĐial oǁŶeƌs͛ of ĐoŵpaŶies 
and accounts that are being used to purchase assets in the UK (see Global Witness, 2013). As the UK 
Anti-Corruption Plan (2014:  45) states: 
 
͚Nuŵeƌous studies haǀe ideŶtified the ƌole of ĐoŵpaŶǇ ŵisuse thƌough hiddeŶ oǁŶeƌship iŶ faĐilitatiŶg 
money laundering and corrupt activity. The UK has therefore committed to enhance transparency 
aƌouŶd ǁho ultiŵatelǇ oǁŶs aŶd ĐoŶtƌols UK ĐoŵpaŶies ;the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s ͚people ǁith sigŶifiĐaŶt 
ĐoŶtƌol͛ oƌ ͚ďeŶefiĐial oǁŶeƌs͛Ϳ. This ǁill eŶsuƌe that laǁ eŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt aŶd taǆ authoƌities have access 
to information which will help tackle corruption, tax evasion and the laundering of the proceeds of 
Đƌiŵe.͛ 
 
The Fourth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive7 ;ϮϬϭϱͿ defiŶes ďeŶefiĐial oǁŶeƌship as ͚any natural 
person(s) who ultimately owns or controls the customer and/or the natural person(s) on whose behalf 
a transaction or activity is being conducted͛. A ͚ďeŶefiĐial oǁŶeƌ͛ is ͚a natural person – that is, a real, 
live human being, not another company or trust – who directly or indirectly exercises substantial 
control over the company or receives substantial economic ďeŶefits fƌoŵ the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛ ;Gloďal 
Witness, 2013: 3) – key features therefore are the control exercised and the benefit derived (van der 
Does de Willebois et al., 2011: 3). A detailed analysis of 213 grand corruption cases between 1980 and 
2010 identified that over 70% (150) involved the use of at least one corporate vehicle that concealed, 
at least in part, beneficial ownership. In total, 817 corporate vehicles were used in those 150 cases 
and the UK, its crown dependencies and overseas territories, was the jurisdiction with the second 
highest (after the US) number of registered corporate vehicles  (see van der Does de Willebois et al., 
2011). Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, suĐh Đoƌpoƌate ǀehiĐles aƌe ďeiŶg used to ͚lauŶdeƌ͛ Đoƌƌupt ŵoŶies ǀia the UK͛s 
property market where more than 100,000 property titles totalling £122bn in value in England and 
Wales are registered to overseas companies, including over 36,000 properties in London, with no 
record of the beneficial owners (Financial Times, 2015; see for an online dataset, http://www.private-
eye.co.uk/registry).  
 
Prime Minister David Cameron pledged to respond to the issue of properties ͚ďeiŶg ďought ďǇ people 
oǀeƌseas thƌough aŶoŶǇŵous shell ĐoŵpaŶies, soŵe ǁith pluŶdeƌed oƌ lauŶdeƌed Đash͛ goiŶg oŶ to 
state ͚[t]heƌe is Ŷo plaĐe foƌ diƌtǇ ŵoŶeǇ iŶ BƌitaiŶ͛ ;CaŵeƌoŶ, ϮϬϭϱͿ. The UK͛s pƌoposed CeŶtƌal 
Register of Beneficial Ownership, as stipulated in the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 
2015, will require UK companies to identify those persons with significant control over them in order 
to increase transparency. This will create an obstacle for those seeking to conceal and hide illicit 
monies intended for or generated from corporate bribery. 
 
A further related issue heƌe is that fiŶaŶĐial iŶstitutioŶs suĐh as ďaŶks aƌe ͚ faƌ too ǁilliŶg to do ďusiŶess 
with anonymous compaŶies͛ ;Gloďal WitŶess, ϮϬϭϯ: ϳͿ aŶd heƌe ǁe ŵight also iŶĐlude otheƌ 
legitimate professionals and organisations such as legal, accountancy, and other related fiduciary 
firms. The Serious Crime Act 2015 has attempted to shift criminal accountability towards such 
͚faĐilitatoƌs͛ aŶd ͚eŶaďleƌs͛ of ĐƌiŵiŶal ďehaǀiouƌ ďǇ ĐƌiŵiŶalisiŶg eǀeŶ the uŶǁittiŶg aǁaƌeŶess of 
their facilitations (e.g. lack of due diligence) and increasing potential sanctions but the role of such 
facilitators remains under-researched (see Middleton and Levi, 2015, for an analysis of the roles of 
lawyers in facilitating organised crime, and Campbell (2015) for detailed analysis of s.45 of the Act). 
 
In view of these laundering techniques, we might also consider the problems and obstacles that 
offenders must confront in order to be successful and these include the ͚nature of the detection, 
reporting and the investigative regime that is in place͛ ;Levi, 2015: 10). For example, ͚the ideŶtifiĐatioŶ 
                                                          
7 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32015L0849  
 14 
of ͞suspiĐiousŶess͟ ďǇ pƌofessioŶals aŶd otheƌs ǁith a legal ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ to Đoŵďat ŵoŶeǇ 
lauŶdeƌiŶg is ofteŶ a judgŵeŶt that the people aŶd/oƌ tƌaŶsaĐtioŶs aƌe ͞out of plaĐe͟ foƌ the soƌt of 
account they have and the people they purport to be͛ (Levi, 2015: 10). However, as discussed earlier, 
a key feature of such offending behaviour is the appearance of both respectability of the offenders 
and legitimacy of the business practices involved: these generate both cultural and technical obstacles 
to detection.  
 
Intervening with ͚oƌgaŶisatioŶ͛ to reduce opportunities for bribery 
 
Understanding how the finances for and from bribery are organised as presented in this article, we 
can begin to analyse and develop actual and potential mechanisms for intervening with the 
processes/opportunities and situations that are necessary to the bribery commission process in order 
to reduce future bribery transactions from taking place. Analysing the scripts of complex economic 
crimes in this way is necessary for designing strategic prevention measures that have lasting reduction 
effects on crime (Chiu et al., 2011). Central to thinking in terms of situational prevention are 
assumptions about the economic rationality of the offenders involved (see Benson et al., 2009; 
Cornish and Clarke, 1986). While we suggest that such models of economic rationality deriving from 
individual decision-making – ŵost ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ ďǇ ͚outsideƌ͛ ĐƌiŵiŶals - are more difficult to apply in the 
context of furthering otherwise legitimate complex organisational goals, thinking in terms of altering 
the situations can nonetheless reduce offending behaviour. We are not arguing that these are the only 
ways of reducing corruption, but it is therefore useful here to consider how models of situational crime 
prevention can be applied to the finances involved in transnational corporate bribery (see table 2). 
 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
To express the issues simply, ͚Đƌiŵes, iŶĐludiŶg ǁhite-collar crimes, are more likely to occur if they are 
easy to commit, have low risks of detection, provide an attractive reward, are encouraged by the 
iŵŵediate eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt, aŶd aƌe easǇ to justifǇ͛ ;BeŶsoŶ et al., ϮϬϬϵ: ϭϴϯ). These aƌe also ͚Đƌiŵes of 
specialised aĐĐess͛ ;FelsoŶ and Eckert, 2015) and as Cressey (1953) argued, every accountant can 
commit embezzlement. Likewise bribery is relatively easy to commit given access to legitimate 
occupational roles and resources  (e.g. those responsible for acquiring and negotiating sales contracts 
are likely to come into contact on a frequent basis with those with decision-making responsibility in 
the tendering process, and it is therefore straightforward to identify potential targets). Businesses 
operating in jurisdictions where enforcement frameworks and infrastructures are less developed than 
that of the UK or other relatively active jurisdictions encounter low risks of detection (and even where 
reported to a Financial Intelligence Unit (Levi, 2012) or detected by the authorities, the obstacles to 
prosecution may be too great (see Lord, 2014b)); while internal compliance systems and policies may 
be accidentally or intentionally under-resourced or are commonly culturally subordinate to the 
primary organisational goals of obtaining business and increasing sales. Furthermore, as bribes can be 
concealed as legitimate transactions, they are unlikely to be scrutinised in-depth unless other activities 
(including media stories) raise concerns.  Even where the rewards from bribes mostly benefit the firms, 
staff benefit personally from the survival of the firms or from personal performance 
bonuses/promotions, and subcultural support is easily built up when there are few external 
behavioural challenges.  
 
Table 2 addresses these five issues, identifying mechanisms and techniques for the reduction of 
bribery by targeting the finances for and from the bribery. Mechanisms of situational prevention are 
already being implemented and these take many forms, while some require development. The 
mechanisms identified here address the necessary and contingency factors shaping offending 
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behaviour at the social-structural/cultural, institutional and individual levels discussed earlier. Many 
of these reduction/prevention strategies involve a high level of state involvement or initiation and 
may appeal to some regulators/investigators more than others. For example, the Serious Fraud Office 
does not have a formal remit for proactive strategies of prevention but is primarily a reactive 
investigation and prosecution authority. Alterations to legal frameworks and requirements, such as 
the introduction of the beneficial ownership register may inform their investigations and prosecutions 
by providing access to more transparent corporate relations: but such a mechanism will also increase 
the effort required for offenders to conceal their illicit monies. However, corporations are perhaps 
best placed to intervene with the immediate offending environments and/or shape the cultures that 
in turn encourage individuals to bribe. For example, by increasing levels of guardianship over how 
corporate finances are moved internally and externally to their immediate business, or by removing 
the available rationalisations of individuals, bribery can be reduced. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In sum, the intention in this article has been to analyse how the funds for and from transnational 
corporate bribery are organised. This is needed to direct attention to those locations, practices and 
relations that are necessary to the transaction and which can subsequently be intervened in line with 
models of situational prevention. These are features of bribery that often remain hidden and are easily 
concealed behind or within the otherwise routine, daily activities of the offenders involved which in 
turn creates obstacles to routine detection mechanisms. By addressing the five areas of situational 
intervention discussed above there is scope to reduce opportunities to offend or reduce the likelihood 
that offenders will opt to capitalise on such opportunities. However, while this article has offered 
theoretical and conceptual insights into the organisation of the finances of corporate bribery, there is 
a clear need for empirical inquiry to provide evidence-based interventions and subsequent evaluation 
of good practice. 
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Figure 1: Areas of necessity and contingency in the commission of bribery 
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